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Action and Artifact:
The Structuring of Technologies-in-Use
ABSTRACT
This paper proposes "technologies-in-use" as a concept for analyzing
technological use and change in organizations. Technologies-in-use are
proposed as the situated and patterned interactions of a technological artifact and
human action. Such a perspective facilitates an analysis of the technological
capabilities actually realized in practice, instead of depending on accounts of
prescribed features, or the social constructions made of them. This distinction
between the technology-as-used and the technology-as-artifact helps to
overcome some of the difficulties faced by the multiple, equivocal notions of
technology characterizing prior organizational research. The usefulness of the
perspective is illustrated by examining two firm's deployment of a particular
information technology artifact and the various technologies-in-use enacted by
the actors who used it. The paper suggests that a focus on technologies-in-use
offers a systematic analytic lens with which to examine the various kinds of
action taken with technological artifacts in particular contexts, how and why
these differ, and how and why they may be associated with different intended
and unintended organizational outcomes.
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Technology does not exist in a vacuum. It is used in specific organizational contexts, interacting
with work practices, social cognitions, political cultures, and institutional structures. The use of
technology in organizations is neither uniform nor invariant, but thoroughly shaped by the
intentions, interests, interpretations, interactions, innovations, and inertia of human agents. As
organizational researchers, we know this about technology and its use, but for years our theories
have struggled to fully account for the situated and interactive nature of technology. In this paper, I
propose a framing of technology that may help some of these struggles. In particular, I argue that
"technology"--the technology of interest in organizational research--is not sensibly conceptualized
apart from the everyday activities of humans in specific historical and contextual conditions, and as
such must be understood as a social practice.
The history of technology studies reveals a number of different approaches to conceptualizing
technology (see reviews by Barley, 1988; Marx and Smith, 1994; Powell, 1988; Scott, 1990). In
these different approaches -- contingency (e.g., Blau et al. 1976), sociotechnical (e.g., Trist et al.,
1986), labor process (e.g., Knights and Willmott, 1988), social constructivist (e.g., Pinch and
Bijker, 1984), network-based (e.g., Burkhardt and Brass, 1990), and structurational (e.g.,
Barley, 1986) -- technology has figured variously as material object, control mechanism,
knowledge, task environment, social construction, social object, and social structure. Despite often
deep ontological divides, these perspectives have in common an interest in the impact of particular
kinds of technology on work, skills, performance, roles, structures, cultures, and so on. Their
research focus, by design, assumes that technology is separable and separate from human action.
This sort of detachment may be useful for purposes such as investigating macrotrends in
technological deployment across organizations and industries, but as a general assumption about
the nature and influence of technology in organizational life, it is misleading. It is misleading,
because technology is of little organizational significance if it is not applied or used. As Orlikowski
(1992a:410) notes, "It is only through human action that technology qua technology can be
understood." To appropriate Kent's (1993:11) point about language: technology becomes
technology only when it is used, and this use of technology -- technology-in-use -- defines its
nature and its influence in human affairs.
The framing of technology outlined in this paper focuses on technology not as physical entity or
social construction, but as a set of constraints and enablements realized in practice. A key
proposition is that the technological artifact used or made sense of by actors, is analytically
different from what actors actually do with that artifact in practice. Such a distinction has been
blurred in the past, and as a result, our understandings of the role of technology in organizations
have often seemed unduly materialistic or subjectivist. A number of scholars have called for a
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distinction between technology and technology in action (Sproull and Goodman, 1990; Weick,
1990), but this has not yet been incorporated into our studies and conceptualizations of technology.
This is my intent here. While the perspective I offer here is premised on the centrality of agency in
technology use, it also recognizes that technologies have an artifactual nature. This perspective
acknowledges the duality between, on the one hand, technology as artifact, a bundle of physical
and/or conceptual features characterized by particular material and informational properties, and on
the other hand, technology-in-use, the patterned interactions of human agents with a particular
technological artifact in specific historical and contextual circumstances.
The theoretical shift proposed here is not simply semantic, but has critical practical and research
implications. The positing of technology as a duality of action and artifact provides a conceptual
apparatus with which to recognize and examine when and how technology use departs from a
priori expectations, prescribed features, or intended outcomes. Rather than seeking uniform and
universal effects from particular material objects, or examining the various consequences resulting
from different social constructions, this perspective focuses on identifying the practices that actors
engage in with particular technological artifacts in various historical and institutional contexts. In
the following, I use the notions of enactment (Weick, 1979) and structuring (Giddens, 1984) to
develop the concept of technologies-in-use as the situated and patterned interactions of
technological artifact and human action. I illustrate this theoretic framing by drawing on an
investigation of various actors' experiences with a particular technological artifact, a software
product intended to support collaborative work, in two organizational settings. The empirical
evidence highlights, not only that different actors interpreted and appropriated the artifact
differently, but that they enacted different social practices with it. It is in identifying and
understanding these technologies-in-use, that organizational research can offer a systematic yet
situated and dynamic account of the nature and influence of technology in organizations.
TECHNOLOGICAL ARTIFACTS AND TECHNOLOGIES-IN-USE
The duality of technology posited here is of artifact on the one hand, and the situated patterns of
use involved in utilizing that artifact, technology-in-use. A technological artifact can be seen to be a
set of features bundled together into an identifiable and bounded package. Such features may be
material (as in a tool such as a hammer), conceptual (as in a technique such as TQM), or both (as in
a computer imaging device and its prescribed radiographic procedures). Artifacts are usually
designed and developed under the auspices of explicit objectives and to some particular
specifications. Correspondence between constructed artifact and developers' objectives is certainly
not guaranteed, particularly in the case of complexity and novelty. On the contrary, the production
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process typically generates modifications and deviations -- intended and unintended, recognized
and unrecognized -- that result in an artifact that resembles but rarely reproduces an a priori design.
Once developed, an artifact is packaged, labeled, and marketed so as to convey a certain
impression of its features and potential functionality. Whether through persuasion or imposition,
artifacts then get deployed in a variety of historical and organizational contexts of use, where some
or all of their features may be appropriated by actors in their ongoing practices.
In their action, actors' intentions, interpretations, and institutional context influence how they
utilize the artifacts. While the artifact and context of use may prescribe and proscribe particular
images and forms of use, how actors make sense of the artifact and what they actually do with it is
not predetermined. The use of technological artifacts is an ongoing human accomplishment through
which particular technological constraints and enablements are enacted. Giddens (1984) proposed
the notion of structure as the enacted set of rules and resources that inform and enable social action.
Applying that notion to the use of technology, the concept of technology-in-use can be understood
as the social structure (the set of rules and resources) mobilized by actors in the ongoing and
situated use of a particular technological artifact. In this framing, technology-in-use is both the
medium and the outcome of situated human action.
Distinguishing between technological artifacts and what people actually do with them in practice is
useful because it allows an analytical separation of the potential capabilities of a technological
artifact and the capabilities actually mobilized. Thus, we can compare actual use to prescribed or
potential use, or trace how the use of a given artifact changes over time or varies by context. Such
analyses are not possible where the artifact is conflated with use. Investigations of technology use
have tended to concentrate on the artifacts themselves or users' attitudes towards or social
constructions of artifacts. While useful, such conceptualizations still do not get at the use of
technology in practice. That is where the conceptual lens of technologies-in-use offers a unique
perspective.
Whittington (1992:695-6) notes that in Giddens' view, "structures themselves have no reality
except as they are instantiated in activity or retained mentally as remembered codes of conduct or
rights to resources." In social life, actors do not enact structures in a vacuum; they draw on their
knowledge of prior action and the rules and resources that animated those actions, and in this way,
apply remembered codes and rights to "structure" their current action. Thus, the structures (rules
and resources) enacted by prior human action come to shape individuals' current action, which in
turn recreates the structures anew (with our without modification). While actors display
knowledgeability and capability in their action, these are not entirely conscious or deliberate. Much
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of the knowledgeability and capability of human conduct is displayed "in the vast variety of tacit
modes of awareness and competence," or what he calls "practical consciousness" (Giddens,
1981:163). This vocabulary for understanding the structuring of social practices is a useful one for
developing a perceptive on technologies-in-use as virtual structures, sets of rules and resources that
are realized in human action, informed largely by practical consciousness, and enacted in specific
historical and contextual conditions.
The structuring of technologies-in-use suggests that when a technological artifact is introduced into
a context, actors develop knowledge and understanding, both explicit and tacit, about the kinds of
features offered by the artifact, the sorts of uses to which that artifact may be put within certain
contexts of use, and the likely outcomes of such uses. This knowledge is often derived from
knowledge of other or previous technological artifacts and prior enactments of technologies-in-use.
For example, architects' use of Computer-Aided Design technology often reflects their familiarity
with drawing in two-dimensional space, a process afforded by their prior use of pencil and paper.
As a result, they may not appreciate the possibility and advantages of drawing in the three-
dimensional space facilitated by the new technology. Users' knowledge of an artifact is also
influenced by the images and instructions, demonstrations and directions, presented by vendors,
champions, trainers, and local management (Orlikowski, et al. 1995). In appropriating the
technological artifact in their ongoing action, users constitute a pattern of using the artifact that
defines and establishes a particular technology-in-use. This enacted technology-in-use may be
understood as the set of rules and resources that structure users' interaction with the artifact in
practice. Over time, ongoing enactment of the same technology-in-use tends to reinforce that
pattern of use, so that it becomes routinized, an expedient and habitual response to use of the
artifact within the daily exigencies of organizational life. The establishment and routinization of
particular technologies-in-use within an organization reflects the social tendency towards
institutionalization of practices (Zucker, 1977). Once institutionalized, technologies-in-use serve as
"behavioral and interpretive templates" (Barley, 1988) for using technological artifacts within the
organization.
Institutionalized technologies-in-use, like social structures in general, tend to become reified, and
rather than serving as effective guides to action, they may come to be treated as predetermined and
incorrigible rules and resources that determine future interactions with the technological artifact.
For example, Tyre and Orlikowski (1994) found that early patterns of technology use tend to
become congealed and difficult to change subsequently, while Orlikowski (1991) shows how the
design assumptions built into a software development tool influenced its users so that they had
difficulty conceiving of and developing systems which deviated from the tool's assumptions.
4
However, patterns of technology use can and do change with time, changing circumstances, and
revised motivations. They change through the same process that social structures in general are
changed -- human action. Whether deliberately or inadvertently, every time actors use a
technological artifact they reaffirm the prior technology-in-use or they modify it. Modifications
may result from deliberate adjustments to patterns of use, for example, supervisors requiring
workers to engage safety mechanisms during machine operation, or writers creating customized
templates in the use of desktop publishing software. Or they may be occasioned by inadvertent
slippages or breakdowns, when, either through inattention or error, users fall into a different form
of use, such as forgetting to attach safety guards, or halting use of a component because it is
unreliable or awkward to use. Changes may also result from improvisations -- situated innovations
responding to an unexpected opportunity or problem -- such as when a temporary workaround or
experiment becomes regular practice because it turned out to be more effective than the original
mode of operation.
Technologies-in-Use: Rules
Giddens (1984) defines rules as generalizable procedures constituted in the enactment of social life.
This enacted definition of rules departs from our everyday understanding of rules as external,
given prescriptions for social conduct that may be formalized in corporate policy (e.g., production
orders, safety regulations), legislation (e.g., tax law, traffic rules), or exist informally as in
articulated or unarticulated "ground rules" or "rules of thumb." Giddens' rules are also not to be
confused with cognitive schemas or "mental structures" as some have suggested (Sewell, 1992).
Conceiving of rules as either external prescriptions or mental constructs assumes they have an
existence outside of practice, and hence departs from the notion of rules as constituted in action.
Taylor, in a recent discussion, critiques these two commonplace (mis)conceptions of rules -- the
subjectivist reduction to cognitive phenomena and the objectivist reification:
We may attribute formulations of the rule as thoughts to the agents. ... [or we may] see the rule-as-represented
as defining an underlying "structure." We conceive this as what is really causally operative, behind the backs of
the unsophisticated agents, as it were.(1993:55)
Noting that both distort the nature of rules by removing the essential role of agency, he continues:
In its operation, the rule exists in the practice it "guides." ... the practice not only fulfills the rules, but also
gives it concrete shape in particular situations. ... In fact, what this reciprocity shows is that the "rule" lies
essentially in the practice. The rule is what is animating the practice at any given time, not some formulation
behind it, inscribed in our thoughts or our brains or our genes or whatever. That is why the rule is, at any
given time, what the practice has made it. (1993:57-58, emphasis in original)
While individuals have knowledge of various substantive or normative procedures, such
knowledge does not in and of itself constitute rules because it may not be drawn on in action. For
example, individuals may have detailed knowledge of the operations of tabulator equipment (Yates,
1993), or the codes of conduct that prevail among the computer hacker community (Turkle, 1984),
but they typically do not use these to inform their contemporary behavior. While knowledge of
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tabulator function or hacker custom constitutes part of these individuals' interpretive schemes, it
does not constitute rules (in the structurational sense) until that knowledge informs their action.
So it is with the substantive and normative procedures that are built into or prescribe the operation
of technological artifacts. Through their design, construction, and packaging, technological
artifacts come to reflect and embody specific assumptions, procedures, and knowledge about the
world and use of artifacts within it (Noble, 1984; Perrow, 1983; Suchman, 1987; Winner, 1986).
For example, automobiles reflect knowledge as diverse as combustion engines and styling
preferences, and they embody procedures for appropriate operation (such as, shifting gears with
the clutch engaged, not moving with the brakes on or seatbelts off, etc.). When used regularly to
facilitate action, the knowledge and procedures embodied within the technological artifact become
enacted as rules, as part of the technology-in-use. Not all the knowledge and procedures
composing the artifact need be activated all the time (e.g., not using windshield wipers when it's
not raining), and not all the knowledge and procedures need be activated intendedly. Further, some
of the knowledge and procedures may be enacted differently to that intended by the designers
(e.g., driving without engaging the seatbelts). Different actors may generate different rules for their
use of a technological artifact and these are likely influenced by their engagement in different social
contexts. For example, taxi drivers utilize their automobiles differently when they are "being a
cabbie" than when they act as private citizens. The different use practices or technologies-in-use
enacted in those different circumstances are also likely to differ from the use practices of ambulance
drivers, learner drivers, and drunk drivers. Thus, while the technological artifact in each case may
be similar or perhaps even the same, the contexts of its use and the intentions, knowledgeability,
and capabilities employed by the human actors utilizing the artifact will vary, generating a variety
of technologies-in-use.
When enacted as rules, the knowledge or procedures that are embodied in an artifact, serve as
enablements and constraints on users' actions. For example, thousands of Americans annually use
a tax preparation software program to complete their tax returns. Knowledge of the Federal tax
code, mathematics, and the structure and requirements of various tax forms informed the design of
this artifact. As people use the software program, they enact that knowledge as tax reporting rules
which enable the creation of various forms (e.g., a "1040 Form") and appropriate accompanying
worksheets. Simultaneously, the enactment of those rules constrains these individuals' ability to
use the artifact to create alternative tax reporting representations (say a "999 Form"), to follow the
procedures of the British tax code, or to calculate the totals in a more "creative" way.
Distinguishing between knowledge of rules and rules themselves allows the examination of how
knowledge is used (or not used) in the enactment of particular rules in various circumstances, and
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when or how enacted rules may deviate from knowledge of rules in practice. For example, when
the IRS instituted a change in filing procedures by allowing electronic filing of tax returns, some
users changed their pattern of using tax preparation software by performing all the work
electronically and then simply downloading the completed electronic "forms" to the IRS
computers.
Technologies-in-Use: Resources
Giddens (1984:33) defines resources as capabilities or "forms of transformative capacity" that
generate command over objects, goods, or material phenomena, and command over persons in
processes of structuring. He has also noted (1977:133) that: "By 'resources' I mean whatever
[capabilities] actors are able to bring to bear to facilitate the achievement of their purposes in the
course of social interaction." The emphasis is on capabilities that are used in practice. It is
important that Giddens' notion of resources not be confused with our common-place
understanding of resources as given entities -- whether material, financial, or intellectual -- that
may stand apart from action. Such an error is easy enough to make (see for example, Sewell
(1992)). Giddens' notion of resources, in contrast, is rooted in the use of material, financial, or
intellectual entities in practice through which they provide actors with different capabilities in
various contexts. Outside of human action, these entities no longer count as resources, as Giddens
(1984:33) emphasizes:
Some forms of allocative resources (e.g. land, raw materials etc.) might seem to have a real existence. In the
sense of having a "time-space" presence this is obviously the case. But their "materiality" does not affect the
fact that such phenomena become resources ... only when incorporated within processes of structuration.
Akin to rules then, resources are instantiated in human agency.
Technological artifacts embody a range of features, but these are only constituted as resources (in
the structurational sense employed here) when they are mobilized in human action. Consider the
example of factories. Factories are not resources by virtue of their material existence as so much
steel, concrete, and equipment. They only count as resources in the ongoing agency of individuals.
In the once-booming US steel and automotive industries, there was a time when steel mills and
automobile plants played a dominant role in the production and reproduction of the US economy.
At that time, the material properties of mills and plants were used by the men and women who
worked in them to generate considerable productive capabilities. Hence, these factories served as
important resources in a context and a set of social practices that valued and utilized their
productive output. Today, most of the steel mills and many of the automobile plants have been shut
down, and these closed factories no longer play a role in the US economy. With their physical
properties still very much intact, these mills and plants are no less material phenomena with a
particular existence in time and space. But they are no longer resources in structurational terms,
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because they are no longer implicated in the ongoing action of human agents; hence, they no longer
generate transformative capacity for human action. In a context redefined by global trade and
electronic technology, the material stock of these mills and plants is no longer seen as useful by
human agents -- at least for the time being. The qualification is important, because conditions can
and do change, and a reevaluation of these old mills and plants in the future may again find in their
material properties (or some modified version thereof) the opportunity to generate transformative
capacity for human action. At that point those factories may serve, once again, as resources if they
are drawn on by human agents in concrete social practices.
Distinguishing between the features offered by artifacts and the resources generated in using those
artifacts allows us to examine how technological features are used (or not used) in the enactment of
particular resources in various circumstances, and when or how enacted resources may depart from
those prescribed by developers or implementors, and across time and context. For example, the
simple technological artifact, the hammer, can be used by a carpenter making a chair, a
construction worker building a condominium complex in the suburbs, an auto mechanic panel-
beating a fender back into shape, and a sculptor chipping away at stone to produce a piece of art. In
these various uses, the same technological artifact becomes a resource generating a variety of
capabilities for action. Indeed, a hammer may even generate useful capabilities for my action. Most
of the time a hammer just lies, buried and half-forgotten in the bottom of my kitchen closet and as
such does not serve as a resource in my ongoing activities. But there are some situations when its
material properties will come in handy and on those occasions -- when I use it to take action in the
world such as hanging a picture on a wall or arming myself against an unwanted intruder -- that
hammer becomes a resource. Thus, across time and a diversity of places -- the woodshop, the
construction site, the garage, the art studio, and my home -- a particular technological artifact, the
hammer, is implicated in the production and reproduction of multiple and various social practices --
furniture making, building construction, automotive repair, art, home improvement, and self-
defense. In these various uses of a single technological artifact, a range of technologies-in-use can
be enacted, some anticipated by its developers, others not.
Technologies-in-Use: Rules and Resources
While the above discussion has consider rules and resources separately, in practice they are
inherently and reciprocally dependent on each other. The manipulation of resources always
involves both substantive and normative aspects of knowledge, while, resources provide the
means by which these substantive and normative rules are actualized (Cohen, 1987:287). As
structures, technologies-in-use are produced, reproduced, and sometimes modified in the ongoing
enactment of rules and resources through mobilization of knowledge and capabilities. And the kind
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of technology-in-use that is generated depends on the features of the artifact, the knowledge and
intentions of the actors, as well as historical and institutional conditions. While the carpenter, auto
mechanic, and sculptor all use a hammer in their work, the technologies-in-use they generate -- the
particular rules and resources that structure their action -- are very different, as are the outcomes of
that use. And it is in these differences between a given artifact and its various uses by different
actors across contexts and time, that the creative and transformative aspects of technology as
practice lie.
INVESTIGATING TECHNOLOGIES-IN-USE
Investigating the structuring of technologies-in-use requires the identification and collection of data
on the technological artifact in question, the knowledge users have of the artifact, the institutional
contexts of use, and the actions taken by users with the artifact. These data can then be analyzed to
identify patterns of use which embody particular rules and resources, and the consequences,
intended and unintended, of such patterns of use. The intent in the analysis is to examine whether
and why users' social practices involving a particular technological artifact result in the enactment
of different technologies-in-use, and what the organizational implications of such practices are.
Giddens (1979) suggests that an explication of virtual structures requires examining actors'
knowledge (memory traces, whether explicit or tacit, of "how things are to be done"), their social
practices (organized through the recursive mobilization of that knowledge), and the capabilities
implicated in the production of their practices. Likewise, the virtual technologies-in-use may be
investigated by examining those social practices that involve technological artifacts, and the
relevant knowledge and capabilities used by actors to accomplish those practices.
The technological artifact can be examined by interviewing the artifact's key designers and
promoters and probing on their motivation and intentions for the artifact, their design approaches
and decisions, as well as the influences on these choices. As Suchman (1983:3) points out: "Every
human tool relies upon, and reifies, some underlying conception of the activity that it is designed to
support." It is that underlying conception of the activity that is of interest when interviewing tool
developers. The documentation accompanying the artifact's production, packaging, and
promotion, as well as any instruction manuals can also be analyzed. Observation of the artifact in
operation, further provides materials for characterizing the features and functionality of the given
artifact. DeSanctis and Poole (1994:126) suggest examining a technology's "feature set" as a way
of identifying the "social structures provided by an advanced information technology." However,
they do not differentiate between technological artifacts and technologies-in-use, and hence imply
that social structures are embodied in given artifacts. The perspective presented in this paper posits
instead that the feature set of a given artifact provides some of the potential capabilities that actors
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invoke as rules and resources in their enactment of technologies-in-use. A number of dimensions
for characterizing the feature set of an artifact have been proposed (DeSanctis and Poole, 1994) and
one or other of these may be followed, or dimensions may be constructed from the data. The intent
is to describe those features that are generally available as potential capabilities to be drawn on by
users in their action, rather than exhaustively characterize every aspect of the artifact.
The enactment of technologies-in-use depends on the knowledge that users have of the artifact and
their institutional context, their motivation and skills in applying that knowledge, and the
conditions of their action. The repeated enactment of a technology-in-use depends on knowing
what is possible (technical feasibility) and what is useful, effective, and appropriate (institutional
feasibility) within a particular context of use. Users' knowledge of technical and institutional
feasibility may be explored by seeking data on users' technological frames (Bijker, 1987), which
Orlikowski and Gash (1994) define as the assumptions, expectations, and knowledge that
organizational members draw on to understand and use technological artifacts in their work. This
includes not only the nature, role, and functionality of the artifact itself, but the specific conditions,
applications, and consequences of its use in particular contexts. Some aspects of technological
frames are part of users' discursive consciousness, and others are tacit, part of their taken-for-
granted practical consciousness.
As knowledgeable, reflexive actors, users have motivations and intentions for taking certain action,
even if these are not always realized, or realized as intended. Such actions also, inevitably, produce
unintended consequences. Skills in using a technological artifact are usually influenced by
knowledge, cognitive ability, training, and experience, and are particularly relevant in the
enactment of certain and different technologies-in-use. Knowledge of the artifact by users can be
obtained by observing users' interactions with the artifact, and interviewing them about their
understandings of the artifact and its functionality. Actions taken by participants towards the
artifact can be studied by direct observation as well as by interviewing participants about their
actions and intentions. The latter approach may be quite informative, as Giddens (1993:92) notes:
"... given that [an actor] is not dissimulating, her or his testimony as to the purpose and reasons
for her or his conduct is the most important, if not necessarily conclusive, source of evidence about
it." The institutional context of use can be investigated by focusing on dimensions of the workplace
that embody the rules and resources guiding action, such as tasks, division of labor, norms,
incentive systems, roles, and control mechanisms.
The value of the technology-in-use perspective became particularly apparent after I had completed
two field studies into the implementation and use of a particular technological artifact, the Notes®
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software product ([cites suppressed]). The range of technologies-in-use enacted with this same
artifact both across as well as within the organizations highlights the value and importance of the
technology-in-use perspective proposed here. Some of the technologies-in-use varied considerably
from designers' or implementors intentions, some varied by context and over time, and others
involved innovation around the prescribed features. Such uses and their associated organizational
outcomes would not have been predicted by an examination of the artifact in question or users'
constructions of it. Before examining the technologies-in-use enacted with the Notes artifact, a
discussion of the artifact is appropriate.
Technological Artifact: Notes
Data about the technological artifact were collected by interviewing its chief designer and two
individuals involved in its product development. All three interviews lasted just over an hour in
length and were largely unstructured in format to allow for open-ended discussion about the
technological artifact. Further information about the artifact was obtained from product descriptions
and promotional materials provided by the vendor, as well as trade reports published by software
reviewers. I also had access to the artifact itself, and could examine its espoused features and
prescribed functionality.
The Notes technological artifact differs from typical organizational software products which are
intended to support either transaction processing (such as order entry and inventory systems), or
individual work (such as spreadsheet or word processing programs). Notes represents a class of
software product that has come to be known as "groupware," where the intent is to support the
work of groups by facilitating discussion, information exchange, and collaboration across time and
space. The CEO of Lotus noted in a speech in 1991 that groupware and Notes, represent "a shift
from notions of information processing to information sharing," which provide "a new paradigm
for computing in the nineties." The intellectual roots of this new type of organizational computing
are located in the research community of computer and social scientists who, in the early eighties,
began studying what they call "computer-supported cooperative work".
The Notes software operates on personal computers connected to local area networks, and the
capabilities it provides are communication tools (via electronic mail and bulletin boards), document
management (via shared databases), security (via public key encryption of electronic information),
and application development (through customization of existing database templates, or construction
with a built-in programming language). The major features of the artifact as espoused by its
developers are summarized in Table 1. Notes requires both a "client," the software which runs on
each users' machine and which offers a graphical, tailorable, icon-based user interface, and the
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"server," the software which runs on the network and manages the communication among users
("clients") and their shared access to databases and bulletin boards maintained within the Notes
environment, both locally and remotely (see Figure 1). The Notes product is sold and distributed
by the Lotus Development Corporation, but it was developed by a small organization working with
funding from Lotus. The founder of the firm and chief architect of Notes, was Ray Ozzie, a former
employee of Lotus. My data revealed a number of influences on the design and construction of the
Notes artifact: historical, institutional, and market.
Historical influences. The origin of the Notes artifact has roots in the Plato system at the University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. While a student of computer science in the seventies, Ozzie was
exposed to the Plato system, a mainframe-based computing environment on the Illinois campus
developed by researchers to test the feasibility of on-line tutoring systems. Technically, the Plato
system was ahead of its time with graphical, interactive interfaces and communication software
which facilitated campus-wide computer conferencing. Written by a local systems programmer and
known as Plato Notes, the communication software made a big impression on Ozzie, as he recalled
years later:
The [Plato] Notes tool was created to help systems programmers communicate with each other. But I saw other
people, people who had no knowledge of computers, using this tool to collaborate on projects, to interact, to
establish relationships with other people, people they had never seen or met. It was amazing.
After graduating and working in the software industry for a number of years, Ozzie returned to the
communication capabilities that had so influenced him in Illinois:
In the early 80s I was working in spreadsheets, but spreadsheets didn't turn me on. So my mind turned to Plato
and what I had experienced there -- collaboration and communication. I wanted to start my own company to
develop those things.
This prior exposure to and experience of a mainframe-based "groupware" functionality clearly
shaped Ozzie's mental model of the kind of technological capability that could be provided, and
why and how it might be useful. He indicated that his vision for the Notes artifact came from the
simple and single idea of providing a tool that would support collaboration among individuals. He
believed that such a tool could be useful more broadly, although admits that at that time he did not
have any real evidence for this belief:
My vision came from the fact that I saw lots of people in little research groups collaborating across the world
with this tool. ... I had never really worked in a corporate culture and did not understand the dynamics of a
business, and how people worked in them. But I knew that great things would happen if they communicated
and talked to each other.
Ozzie started his own company in 1984 with financing from Lotus Development Corporation. He
hired four colleagues, two of whom were college buddies who had also experienced the Plato
system. The five developers then spent a number of years (from 1984 to 1989) designing,
building, and testing the Notes artifact. While funded by Lotus, the team retained creative and
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technical autonomy, designing and building the Notes product from the blueprint developed by
Ozzie in 1984. Most of the critical design decisions had been determined early, as Ozzie explained:
I had a high-level idea of what I wanted to do. ... I had envisioned Notes to have such functions as
conferencing, word processing, mail, and so on. ... So from day one, it had a graphic user interface, client
server architecture, and public key cryptography. So all the major design decisions were made before we started.
The inspiration for the functionality of the Notes artifact was clearly Plato Notes, with the ideas for
the technical implementation coming from some of the other computing platforms the five
designers knew about or had experienced in their years since college, as Ozzie noted:
There is virtually nothing unique about Notes. My highest level goal of the utmost user collaboration came
from Plato. The architectural foundation came from personal computers and networks, that is, local-area
networks from Data General and PC's from Software Arts.
Notable in the inventors' view of Notes, is a lack of specificity about the ways in which the tool
would be used in organizational settings. Ozzie commented that:
The product as shipped was essentially the creative vision of the founders. We still had not participated in real
businesses, so we didn't know what they [organizations] would use it for.
Institutional influences. Many of the design decisions that were made in the construction of the
Notes artifact were strongly influenced by the values and norms of the five-person development
team, and the kinds of work processes they had established. As these five individuals created the
Notes artifact, they were also creating an institutional context, and many of the norms and
procedures established for their company also informed their product development work, and were
embodied in the artifact. Ozzie explained that they deliberately created a software development
context which was different from that of many technological production environments:
As a group of individuals we share the same beliefs about how we'd like to see people work -- the Iris values.
We implemented a very different software development methodology here that relies on distributed
management, distributed security, and distributed development. ... It's an anarchistic model of source code
management which we deal with by having tools that resolve conflict among us. Centralized management is
something that is counter to how we feel, to our philosophy.
This philosophy of decentralized control enacted within the Notes development environment is
strongly reflected in all aspects of the Notes artifact, which has a highly distributed architecture.
One of the features of the artifact is the ability for users to create customized applications which
utilize the underlying Notes functionality. As Ozzie notes, the capability to "build" applications was
extended to any user, in conformance with the overall design philosophy of the developers:
A design debate we had a lot was does every copy of Notes have the ability to design applications or do we
have a developer's copy and user copies? In practice, while it is a nightmare for the MIS person to have this
[design] capability on every copy of Notes, it makes the product more exciting for the users because anyone can
turn from a user to a developer overnight. We wanted individuals to have independence over their work.
Distribution is a value that pervades our philosophy. So technically and architecturally the product [Notes]
embraced distribution.
Market influences. Because the notion of groupware was not well established in the late eighties,
Lotus, who assumed responsibility for marketing and selling the Notes product, struggled to put a
label on the artifact that would convey its functionality to prospective users. As Ozzie recalls:
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[Lotus] thought Notes was a good idea. But they had no idea of how to sell it. ... One person on the Lotus
project review team for the product -- from Marketing -- said "I don't like it because I don't know how to sell
it." He was right. It did not look like a shrink-wrapped product.
A number of Notes supporters within Lotus decided to get some early customer feedback on the
product, so they set up a group of some 30 customers to test the product. These early customer
responses helped significantly to define the artifact, as two product managers recalled:
We held a round table session in the first quarter of 1989 -- customers, developers, marketing people -- all
sitting around talking about the product. It was unusual to do that at Lotus. We were all looking for the sound
bite. [One senior executive] had a great insight. He said "Let the customers define your product for you. Tell
the world what the first customer says it is. Let the market position it for you."
We went around and talked to these [test] customers -- we saw them as our "design partners" -- and got their
feedback. Then we incorporated their ideas and feedback into our presentations at the next customer. Maybe this
was cheating, but it was an iterative definition of the product.
This decision to "let the customer define your product" generated a better understanding of what
the artifact might be useful for in the market. Ozzie admits:
I have been educated. I am an engineer by trade. I didn't go to business school. If I had, I would have understood
better what I was building.
Customer participation in product definition also generated much interest in Notes among these
early beta sites, and many became official customers once the product was launched in late 1989.
As an artifact, Notes was designed and constructed by a group of computer designers, to
implement in a personal computer environment the capabilities of document sharing and electronic
communication that had previously only been available in a mainframe environment. It was
deliberately designed to embody a decentralized architecture and allow ongoing user adaptation to
the artifacts. Its positioning in the marketplace was influenced by a number of factors, most
importantly the growing interest in and spread of local area networks, the academic interest in
computer-supported collaborative work, and key customers experiences during beta testing. The
definition of Notes as groupware, as a new paradigm of organizational computing was clearly a
social construction -- a marketing strategy to differentiate the product from other artifacts such as
spreadsheets and electronic mail systems, and to position it as a strategic product for organizations
operating in global, team-based conditions.
Enacting Technologies-in-Use with the Notes Technological Artifact: Alpha
I studied the implementation and use of the Notes artifact within a large, multi-national consulting
firm (here known as Alpha). Alpha has offices in hundreds of cities around the world and employs
over 10,000 consultants who work on project engagements within a matrix operating structure to
deliver professional services to clients. In the late eighties, a Chief Information Officer (CIO)
position was created with responsibility for Alpha's global use of information technology. Having
been recently exposed to the Notes technological artifact, the CIO was persuaded that it offered the
functionality to not only provide corporate-wide electronic mail support, but also to facilitate
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electronic discussions and knowledge sharing. These capabilities, he believed, would address the
considerable "reinvention of the wheel" which occurred within Alpha when consultants in different
offices worked on similar client problems without sharing knowledge, approaches, or solutions,
and thus duplicating effort and not leveraging the existing expertise and experience of the firm. The
CIO purchased thousands of copies of Notes for Alpha's consultants, and ordered his staff to
install it (and the supporting infrastructure of hardware and networks) quickly in all offices, so as
to achieve a critical mass of users as soon as possible.
My study within Alpha was conducted in 1991, about a year after the firm's acquisition of Notes.
A five-month field study was concentrated within one large practice office (see [cite suppressed]
for more details). Data collection included interviews, document review, and observation of
meetings, work sessions, and training classes. Participants spanned all four of Alpha's hierarchical
levels (junior consultant, senior consultant, manager, and principal), included some administrative
and technology support personnel. The data collected at Alpha were analyzed by careful reading
and recursive coding to identify how use of the technological artifact reflected and shaped the rules
and resources enacted in such use. A qualitative approach was used to analyze the data in terms of
the categories of interest identified above. Because technologies-in-use, as social structures, are
virtual, they cannot be directly observed, and must be inferred. Data about participants' actions,
complemented by data about participants' knowledge of the artifact, their intentions, motivations,
as well as their institutional context of use, grounded the inferences about the kinds of
technologies-in-use being enacted.
Consultants working on client engagements performed a range of managerial and technical
consulting services, some standardized and routine, some unique and research-intensive. Most of
the actual work was done by the junior and senior consultants working at clients' sites, with
managers and principals providing supervision and managing client relations from the office. All
the consultants were, to a greater and lesser extent, influenced by (and in turn, reinforced) the
Alpha institutional context within which they worked. The dimensions of the institutional context
held different salience for different consultants, depending on status, role, tenure, and individual
differences. Four distinct types of technologies-in-use characterized the interaction of Alpha
consultants with the Notes artifact (see Table 2). The first of these--technological shunning--is
essentially a pattern of nonuse where users choose not to use the artifact at all. The second--
technological skepticism--is a pattern of use where users doubt the artifact can provide any
benefits, so they attempt only limited and half-hearted uses of its capabilities. The third--
technological substitution--is a pattern of use where users utilize the artifact to perform
electronically what had previously been done in other ways, for example, distributing memos
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electronically rather than on paper or sending electronic mail instead of voice mail or faxes. The
fourth--technological exploration--is a pattern of use where users are interested in using the artifact
in their work, but their use is wary, short-lived, and episodic, either because they lack necessary
skills and knowledge or because they are concerned about the consequences of such use within
their institutional context. Let us look briefly at each in turn.
Technological Shunning
For consultants engaging in the technological shunning pattern of use, the institutional features of
their context were particularly influential. Alpha's governance structure -- a partnership -- with its
attendant "up or out" career path which controls progress of all consultants via four primary
milestones influenced consultants to act competitively. This competitive culture was felt most
keenly by senior consultants and managers anticipating the partnership hurdle, and they believed
that their use of Notes would hurt, not help, their chances of promotion. For example:
Power in this firm is your client base and technical ability. ... Now if you put all this information in a Notes
database you lose power. There will be nothing that's privy to you, so you will lose power. It's important to
me that I am selling something that no one else has.
In Alpha we have a lot of problems getting people to share expertise and information. That is not in the
culture. ... People hide information because it gives them an edge.
I'm trying to develop an area of expertise that makes me stand out. If I shared that with you you'd get the credit
not me.
The corporate psychology makes the use of Notes difficult. Particularly the consultant career path which creates
a back-stabbing and aggressive environment. People aren't backstabbing consciously, it's just that the
environment makes people maximize opportunities for themselves.
For many consultants, use of Notes in an environment of competitive individualism -- which
reinforced individual effort and ability, and did not support cooperation or sharing of expertise --
meant risking their expertise and status. As a result, they chose not to use it.
Other consultants engaged in technological shunning as a response to billing practices. For all
consultants except principals, there was an expectation within Alpha that most if not all hours
should be "chargeable," that is, billed to clients and hence revenue-producing. Consultants were
evaluated on how many "below the line" (i.e., nonchargeable) hours they incurred and most
consultants studiously avoided having any. 1 Because many of the consultants did not perceive
using Notes as an activity that could be billed to clients, they were unwilling to spend time on it,
either to learn or to use the product, as this meant either incurring "nonchargeable hours" or giving
up personal time. For example:
I am not sure seniors have time to learn or use Notes.... As a senior on an engagement your entire time is
chargeable. You're not entitled to charge nonchargeable hours.
1 Even though they had been told to charge their time I spent interviewing them to a professional activities code, many
consultants confided that they would "swallow the time" so as to avoid any dreaded "below the line" hours.
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Intellectually I understand the need to use something like Notes, but when we make an investment in Alpha to
learn systems or technology usually that is not a chargeable hour, that is, it is "below the line." But it is a
chargeable hour I could have spent elsewhere. ... Seniors and managers never have nonchargeable hours. It's
just not done. It doesn't happen.
We don't have the time to read or enter information in Notes. What would I charge it to? We already complain
that we can't charge our reading of our mail to anything. We end up having to charge it to ourselves [he reads
his mail on the train going home].
While the acquisition of Notes and its attendant technical infrastructure was decided by the
President and CIO, the spending of time and money on training and application development was
left to the discretion (and budgets) of individual principals in local offices. One principal, a more
enthusiastic Notes supporter, reported frustration at his more reluctant colleagues:
One of the biggest problems we have here is turf battles, i.e., keeping score by office and department. So
people get protective of their time and resources and don't want to spend money on training or database
development.
Evaluation criteria of consultants were not amended to reflect use of the Notes artifact, and
consultants were not rewarded for using the Notes artifact. On the contrary, some were negatively
affected when their use of Notes incurred "non-billable" hours and implied loss of some unique
competence. Thus, consultants' enactment of the technological shunning pattern of using the Notes
artifact was strongly influenced by the firm's institutional context with its partnership structure,
competition, individual evaluation criteria, incentives, norms, and time-based billing practices.
Such a pattern of use, in turn, served to further reinforce the firm's existing institutional context.
Technological Skepticism
A pattern of technological skepticism was enacted by consultants who had doubts about the value
of the artifact in their work and whose use of Notes consequently remained limited. The
technology-in-use reflects a lack of conviction by the users that the artifact could improve either
their personal or the firm's performance. Some of these consultants were skeptical about
technology in general and applied this same skepticism to the particular case of Notes, as in this
principal's reaction:
I first heard about Notes when I read in the Wall Street Journal that Alpha had purchased a revolutionary new
piece of software. My first thought was -- how much is this costing me personally? ... this kind of
implementation affects all of our pocketbooks. ... I have [heard that] there is no value in information
technology -- so you can imagine how I feel!
and that of a manager:
My workstyle is heavily interpersonal and oral. So far computers have not really saved me time. I am not
interested in doing all that protocol stuff to get access. I don't want to deal with a programmer's conception of
the world. ... I approach Notes with the attitude "Do I really need this?" ... I see computers as black and white,
and so as not really suitable to my work.
Others based their skepticism on an assumption that the Notes artifact primarily facilitated static or
unreliable information transfer. For example:
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I don't believe that Notes will help our business that much, unless all of our business is information transfer.
It's not. Business is based on relationships. Ideas are created in non-work situations, socially, over lunch, etc.
People misreport information in databases; a few phone calls are worth more. Most of the stuff on Notes is
junk mail. Anything important comes over the phone. I am very skeptical of the value of Notes.
A vivid illustration of user skepticism occurred a few days after I had interviewed a manager.
Arriving to work in the morning, he sought me out, commenting: "The other day you asked me
what I thought of Notes. Well, here's your answer." He then handed me a cartoon he had clipped
from that morning's newspaper (see Figure 2).
Consultants who enacted the technological skepticism pattern of using the Notes artifact often had
limited knowledge of the artifact's capabilities, even after taking the hands-on training class,
watching the half-hour video, and receiving copies of users' guides. None of these training options
emphasized the collaborative capabilities of Notes, and did little to illustrate how Notes could be
used in consulting practice. The training sessions and materials were technical, non-specific in
content, and dealt with the mechanics of using the software individually, for example, how to
utilize functions such as electronic mail, text editing, and database browsing. Most consultants
found the training less than helpful. One manager referred to it as "condescending," while another
noted: '"Training here is so basic it doesn't tell you much." Many consultants had not referred to the
users' guides, which often lay, still shrink-wrapped, in the corner of their offices. The particular
mental model consultants developed of Notes as a result of the training sessions and materials,
encouraged some of the skepticism and disinclination to spend much time using the artifact. While
these consultants occasionally used Notes, their skepticism and lack of enthusiasm qualifies their
use as little more than dabbling. Of the consultants that I shadowed, half enacted this technological
skepticism pattern of use, and on average, used Notes for two minutes a day -- merely to check
their electronic mail. A comment from one principal captures the sense of this pattern of use:
At this moment I use Notes less than five minutes a week ... I look at it when I am on the phone, to kill time
when I am bored.
Consultants' enactment of the technological skepticism technology-in-use were strongly influenced
by their prior experiences with information technology and their mental models about what such
artifacts could accomplish in practice. The process of implementing the Notes artifact within Alpha
did not offer counter-examples and did not help consultants' change their mental models. The lack
of work and context specificity to the training and applications only served to further reinforce
these consultants' prior skepticism, and created the notion that this artifact was merely "a solution
in search of a problem."
Technological Substitution
The third type of technology-in-use identified among the consultants involves use of the artifact to
substitute for some existing ways of doing things. This technology-in-use is a common response
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to unfamiliar technological artifacts. As Barley (1988:50) notes, there is evidence that "workers
attempt to assimilate new technologies under previous patterns of practice and interpretation." In
the absence of new interpretations and routines, actors often deal with new technological artifacts
by applying existing cognitive frameworks to make sense of them, by subsuming use of the
artifacts within established routines, and employing the artifacts to solve existing problems.
In the case of Alpha, a number of consultants and administrative staff began to use the Notes
artifact for activities they had previously conducted in other media. For example, they began
distributing memos electronically rather than on paper, sending one-to-one or broadcast electronic
mail messages rather than leaving voicemail messages, and transferring files to other offices rather
than sending faxes or using express mail. Some managers also browsed Notes databases to read
electronic newsfeeds from Reuters and industry newsletters. Users enacted this technology-in-use
conceived of Notes in familiar terms,
I see Notes as a personal communication tool. That is, with a modem and fax applications I can do work at
home or at a client site and use Notes to transfer work back and forth. In the office instead of getting my
secretary to make 20 copies of a memo, she can just push a button.
and found familiar uses for Notes in their everyday activities:
I use Notes a lot to look up the [consulting topics] index. It used to be a pain to use it before as you used to
have to get up and walk over to another computer. I never bothered to do it and would get my staff to do it.
Now I can just access it from my Notes menu.
I send Notes [electronic mail] when I really don't want to talk to some people. I have no time for niceties or
phone chatter, but I want them to get my point and Notes leaves a paper trail.
The technological substitution pattern of use was compatible with the firm's existing institutional
context because by automating existing tasks it did not risk violating norms of individualism and
time-based billing practices. Users utilized the artifact as a filing cabinet, a distribution channel,
and communication medium, and did not attempt to substantially change their work practices with
it. The technological substitution pattern of use typically provides incremental improvements in
existing ways of doing things; it is less likely to produce significant organizational changes.
Technological Exploration
The final pattern of use involved consultants who were interested in the possibilities of using Notes
more centrally in their work, but were cautious in doing so. While they were willing to experiment
with alternative capabilities, they struggled to fully integrate use of the artifact into their work
practices. In contrast to the users who saw the firm's competitive institutional context as a barrier
to using Notes (and hence engaged in technological shunning), the users enacting technological
exploration saw Notes as an opportunity to avoid expectations of reciprocity and to promote
themselves within the competitive institutional context, for example:
The value of Notes is that it allows access to information without having to confront individuals, or deal with
the quid pro quo stuff that goes on in personal exchange of information.
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I want to be able to share more within Notes. ... to the extent you make an impression, people will recognize
you're a [domain] expert and will call on you more. That will make you more visible. If you're a hotshot but
no one knows it, that doesn't help you.
Things on Notes have authorship and that allows you to disseminate your expertise further than you normally
would. I think that could be a plus.
Realization of these opportunities, however, remained difficult because users continued to be
puzzled about aspects of the artifact and conditions of its use. These puzzles were not borne of
skepticism but from uncertainty about how the technology works in practice, and ambiguity about
the consequences of its use. One significant issue concerned questions of liability, both personal
and corporate. Principals, in particular, were worried about the disclosure of corporate
information, client confidentiality, and perceptions of unfair billing practices, for example:
We need to worry about who is seeing the data. ... Managers should not be able to access all the information
even if it is useful, [e.g.] financial information to clients, because they leave and may go work for competitors.
Client confidentiality is an important issue. The tension is between revealing something about a client that
you should not have, and keeping other people informed about what you are doing. ... There are no safeguards
currently in force to deal with this in [Notes]. That is why people are so gun-shy of using Notes.
What happens if work is repackaged and sold to other clients. ... Clients may have a problem if they know that
a report or the expertise that they paid for will be made available to others. There may be a double standard
going on in the firm. We talk a lot about sharing expertise but we have real client service issues which we
don't talk about.
Managers and senior consultants were also anxious about personal vulnerability or embarrassment:
I would be careful what I put out on Notes though. I like to retain personal control so that when people call me
I can tell them not to use it for such and such. But there is no such control within Notes.
There is a hesitancy here because you don't want to put everything into public information as people may rely
on that information and screw up, and it may reflect badly on you.
These comments reflect users' recognition of the lack of guidelines, policies, and procedures for
using the new technological artifact. While discerning this, they seemed unwilling or unable to take
the initiative to resolve some of the open questions. The CIO had deliberately chosen not to define
new organizational policies for data quality, confidentiality, and liability, seeing this as outside of
his jurisdiction:
We have a relatively open environment in the firm, so we leave privacy and security up to the local people....
As Notes, we're a common carrier; we make no guarantees about data quality.
Contrary to the CIO's expectation, neither the management of the HQ nor that of the local offices,
had devoted time and attention to these issues, hence provoking unease about the nature and locus
of responsibility and liability with respect to the intellectual content and confidentiality of Notes
documents. This significantly contributed to some of the cautious interaction and tentative
experimentation apparent around the Notes artifact.
The technological exploration pattern of use, in contrast to all of the previous three technologies-in-
use, has the potential to produce interesting and innovative changes. In this technology-in-use,
users are not attempting to reproduce established ways of working, but are willing to explore
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alternatives to it, albeit carefully and with some trepidation. While users' puzzles and concerns
remained unresolved, however, this technology-in-use continued to be stalled.
Summary of Alpha's Technologies-in-Use
In these four technologies-in-use enacted by users in Alpha -- technological shunning, skepticism,
substitution, and exploration -- we see different patterns of use that have emerged around the same
technological artifact. Of the four patterns of use identified, none could be said to realize the CIO's
intention of "leveraging expertise," and only the last has the potential -- if as yet unrealized -- to
fulfill the promise intended by Notes developers that their artifact would "facilitate collaboration."
A strong influence on the four patterns of use evident here is the institutional context within which
Alpha consultants work and which constitutes their rules and resources for acting. In the absence
of motivation to depart from or change this institutional context, consultants reinforced it in their
use of the new technological artifact, thereby not taking advantage of the artifact's potential
capabilities to modify their work practices. A different scenario emerged in another company that
adopted the Notes technological artifact.
Enacting Technologies-in-Use with the Notes Technological Artifact: Zeta
I studied the implementation and use of the Notes artifact within the customer support department
(CSD) of Zeta, one of the Top 50 software companies in the US, with $100 million in revenues
and about 1000 employees. The company produces and sells a range of powerful software
products providing capabilities such as decision support, executive information, and marketing
analysis. Zeta is headquartered in the Midwest, with sales and client service field offices
throughout the US and the world. Customer support at Zeta involves providing technical support
via telephone to clients, consultants, client service representatives in the field, and other Zeta
employees. The technical support provided by customer support specialists is a complex activity,
typically involving several hours of research including searches of reference material, attempts to
replicate the problem, and review of program source code. The department employs about fifty
specialists, and is managed by a director and two managers.
In early 1992, the CSD purchased the Notes artifact and developed an application, the Incident
Tracking Support System (ITSS), within it to help keep track of customer calls. Following a
successful pilot in the latter half of 1992, the CSD deployed ITSS throughout the department. The
acquisition of the Notes artifact was motivated by a an expected increase in customer calls due to a
growing customer base and an expanding product range. The existing home-grown call tracking
system was inefficient, poorly used, had questionable data quality, and provided little support to
either the specialists doing problem solving or the managers trying to manage the resources of their
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department. Replacing it became a priority and after a feasibility study of a number of products, the
Notes artifact was selected. Data was collected in two phases at Zeta, during the pilot and initial
implementation to the entire department (August - December 1992), and two years later (July -
December 1994). Interviews, observations, and access to documents and Notes databases
provided a range of qualitative data which was used to understand the use of the Notes artifact
within the CSD (see [cite suppressed] for more details).
Two different types of technologies-in-use characterized the interaction of Zeta support specialists
with the Notes artifact (see Table 3). The first of these -- technological facilitation -- is a
technology-in-use where users appropriate the artifact to support their work practices. The other --
technological improvisation -- is a technology-in-use which involves use of the artifact in response
to unexpected breakdowns, exceptions, slippages, or opportunities within the workplace. The
enactment of these two technologies-in-use within Zeta's CSD was complementary, in that when
the specialists enacted technological improvisation they did so to help their technological
facilitation. In contrast to the Alpha consultants, who largely enacted only one of the technologies-
in-use identified, most of the Zeta specialists engaged in both patterns of interacting with the Notes
artifact, often in parallel.
Technological Facilitation
The technological facilitation pattern of use is enacted by users making extensive use of the
technological artifact to mediate their work practices. Such mediation involves performing
electronically a considerable portion of the work practices, both prior tasks as well as new or
modified ones. In the case of the support specialists, their work practices as mediated through the
use of ITSS both resembled and departed from their prior work practices. Specialists used ITSS to
record every call they took, to maintain an extensive incident history of each call as they worked on
it, and to record the final problem resolution when the closed the call. The use of Notes to create
detailed process documentation was seen by the specialists as more work, but also understood to
help them keep track of work done, to showcase good work, and reuse knowledge:
Everything is much more organized now and there's an audit trail of everything that's done which eliminates a
lot of the gray area where the client said they did this and we didn't do that. We can always prove that we did do
that and a lot less slips through the cracks.
Putting in the steps is useful because it lets the managers know what we've done, and it's a fallback if the
client says we haven't worked on it.
Of course, the entry is just a pain in the neck. But I know in the long run I'd benefit from it ... I find that the
more explicit I was earlier the more it helps me remember when I got back to work on the incident. It gives me
a detailed record of what steps I have already performed. It gives you mental feedback.
The detailed process documentation provided both an increasing and an increasingly valuable
knowledge base (from about 4,000 records in December 1992 to 35,000 in December 1994),
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which specialists searched in order to reuse prior knowledge on current problems. Specialists
reported resolving up to 50 percent of their problems through a search of the ITSS database.
Searching ITSS was helpful not just because it revealed potentially reusable problem resolutions, it
also provided a detailed trace of the work process involved in resolving different types of
incidents, which included as a specialist noted: "... all of the history involved, who you contacted,
when, what you discussed, how you went about trying to pursue the call ... it's all recorded, and
you just need to look at it. It's all in the system." This was seen as beneficial by the specialists,
both to others and themselves, for example:
There are some people whose incidents are books as you read through them. Which is great actually because
they become great resources. Because it is all there, all the thought processes.
The history of the calls in ITSS is very helpful ... you kind of look through the people you know and their
incident histories to see if there was anything else that they tried in resolving the call. It's much more valuable
than just looking at the resolutions.
Specialists also used ITSS to transfer calls to each other, a dynamic distribution of work enabled
by the shared database and communication capabilities of the Notes artifact. This electronic
distribution of calls was reinforced by a shift in the department's structure from an undifferentiated
team of specialists to a front line of junior specialists and a back line of senior specialists. Junior
specialists now took all the calls and transferred the more complex ones via ITSS to their senior
colleagues in the back line. This took much of the pressure off the junior specialist, for example:
It makes it, you know, easier, because if you're on the phone and you know that it's a real busy day you don't
have to worry, "Oh god, how am I going to able to solve this major crisis, and plus take all these other calls
that are coming in?" So it reduces the level of stress that people have, because you don't have to worry about
it. If you can't handle it, you pass it.
The technological facilitation technology-in-use utilized many of the features of the Notes artifact --
electronic text entry and edit, database searching, document management, and electronic
communication. The enactment of this technology-in-use was facilitated by a number of aspects of
the Zeta and CSD institutional context. The definition of the specialist job had been changed since
the deployment of the Notes artifact to include use of ITSS as the mechanism for entry of calls,
documentation of process, and recording of problem resolution. Evaluation criteria employed by
the CSD managers focused on specialists' use of the Notes artifact to enter and document their
calls, the technical problem-solving skills evident in the incident histories, and the quality and
quantity of problem resolutions. The structural division of labor among junior and senior
specialists further influenced specialists in their sharing calls among each other. Sharing of calls
and electronic communication via e-mail reflected the cooperative culture of the CSD, as reflected
in these comments:
It's a very cooperative group, it really is. ... This is a very comfortable environment. There is no sense of right
or wrong. We all realize that nobody's expert in everything.... You have to work it as a team.
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Here, I don't care who grabs credit for my work. You know, it's like we're all the support department. We're not
just individuals, you know. This support department does well because we're a team not because we're all
individuals.
Technological Improvisation
A second technology-in-use was evident in the specialists' interactions with the Notes artifact, and
it involved action they took to deal with unexpected problems or take advantage of unanticipated
opportunities. Such action went beyond the prescriptions of the ITSS application and typically
generated workarounds, new norms, or modified procedures to correct or improve the work. A
number of examples illustrate this mode of interacting with the artifact. One concerned the
expectation that specialists would directly enter into ITSS the details of each call while on the
phone with the customer so as to provide an up-to-the-minute record of all calls being received in
the department. Many specialists, however, found real-time entry of calls too difficult and
developed a practice of bypassing this requirement by jotting down details of a call on paper during
the phone conversation and then entering them into the ITSS database at a later time. The rationale
for this practice was grounded in specialists' concerns about their typing skills and the nature of
listening and comprehending complex, technical problems. For example:
If you're not confident in your typing skills, there's just no way you're going to put a call in online.
When I take a call I always write it out. And the reason for that is I can't type and listen at the same time. I can
write and do it. But I think because I'm trying to listen and type, it just screws me up. ... I have to think while
I'm typing.
I'm not comfortable typing in the incident as they're telling it. I find it's more of a distraction. I'm trying to
figure out what piece of the form to fill in and they're talking rapidly about a problem, so my concentration is
split and I find myself not being able to ask the right questions or forgetting some piece of information.
Another example of technological improvisation arose around the giving of help among specialists.
Before the use of the Notes artifact, specialists gave help when solicited by their colleagues. With
the use of the Notes artifact however, all specialists had access to the database of all calls being
worked on by everyone in the department. As a result, they could browse through each others'
calls to see which ones they could provide help on. Having information on all open calls in the
department created an opportunity for specialists to improvise a new mode of giving help,
proactively. Rather than waiting to be asked for help, specialists browsed the ITSS database and
offered unsolicited help to each other via electronic mail or direct entries in the relevant call records.
Specialists found this unanticipated change in collaboration practices very useful, for example:
We all help each other out, you know. Like if I see Martha's gotten 15 calls and I've only gotten 3, I'm going
to go in and I'm going to help her, whether she feels she needs it or not. I'm going to do some research for her.
She does the same for me. And it's because, you know that one day you'll get killed, the next day you don't get
killed. So, you're going to help whoever's getting hit the hardest that day.
A lot of times I'll see something that's similar to what I may have already worked on. And I might be able to
save them some time from even having to search by telling them what call I resolved this in. I'll send them
Notes mail with my resolution.
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The enactment of the technological improvisation pattern of use was influenced by the CSD
institutional context. In particular, the cooperative culture in the department and the communal and
open atmosphere fostered by the managers, generated a workplace in which exploring alternative
ways of working and helping each other solve problems were valued aspects of the workplace.
Specialists were encouraged rather than reprimanded for taking the initiative to overcome
difficulties or develop new mechanisms for getting work done. While managers recommended a
particular use of ITSS, they did not enforce it, being willing to accept workarounds and variations
if these produced desired results. In a more hierarchic, competitive, and controlling environment
the technological improvisation pattern of using the Notes artifact would be less likely.
Summary of Zeta's Technologies-in-Use
The two patterns of use enacted within Zeta both realized managerial intentions for the Notes
artifact to support the tracking of incidents within the CSD, and to facilitate more effective
management of CSD resources. Both can also be seen to fulfill the promise intended by Notes
developers that their artifact would "facilitate collaboration." The institutional context of use played
a significant role in facilitating such patterns of use, as did the motivations of the managers and
specialists in utilizing a tool to help them deliver better service to their clients.
DISCUSSION
Applying the technology-in-use perspective to the studies of Alpha and Zeta reveals that a range of
different technologies-in-use were enacted by social actors using the same technological artifact.
These differences in patterns of use were realized across both the two organizations as well as
within them. The consultants at Alpha were found to enact four different patterns of interaction
with the Notes artifact, while the specialists at Zeta were seen to enact two different patterns of use
with Notes. Identifying these different technologies-in-use and understanding how they are
generated, why they differ, and how they are reinforced and changed offers the possibility of
explaining why it is that technological artifacts are or are not associated with particular kinds of
outcomes and organizational changes in different user communities, different contexts of use, and
potentially different points in time. These variations in use may be associated with the different
institutional contexts, motivations, and knowledge of relevant organizational actors.
As structures enacted in practice, technologies-in-use will, like other social structures, be strongly
influenced by the institutional context of use. Such patterns of influence are evident in both Alpha
and Zeta. The consultants within Alpha enacted technologies-in-use that barely or only occasionally
utilized the powerful capabilities of the Notes groupware artifact. An examination of the rules and
resources represented by the Alpha technologies-in-use reveals that the consultants drew on
25
III
established forms of knowledge, norms, and bases of power and legitimacy to guide their use (or
nonuse) of the Notes artifact. Not surprisingly, such use largely reinforced the organizational
status quo, and its hierarchical career path, individual criteria for evaluation and promotion,
competitive hoarding of expertise, and time-based billing system. Where some of the technologies-
in-use did provide some marginal and incremental improvements in communication and
information transfer, none of these facilitated substantial changes in organizing structures or
practices. Only one pattern of use, technological exploration, offered hints of the possibility that
the technological artifact might be used to enact a new or different way of working. In their
cautious experimentations, a few users explored new modes of distributing information, different
norms for promoting competencies, and billing clients for value of services rendered rather than
hours of time spent. While representing nascent rules and resources, these explorations were
nevertheless stalled because the institutional context provided little support for innovative behavior
and generated considerable disquiet about the risk and liability associated with untested and
unofficial work procedures, norms, and policies.
The specialists in Zeta, on the other hand, appropriated the Notes artifact into their work practices
so as to facilitate their customer support activities, while also improvising beyond the uses intended
by management. An examination of the rules and resources represented by the Zeta technologies-
in-use reveals that the specialists drew on both established and redefined forms of knowledge,
norms, and bases of power to guide their use of the Notes artifact, thereby helping to change
aspects of the organization. For example, informal norms around appropriate and "politically
correct" process documentation emerged, as did indicators of reliable and quality knowledge for
reuse. The structural shift to front and back lines introduced a hierarchical distinction into the
department, and shifted the locus of power to senior consultants. Managers changed some of the
evaluation criteria they used to assess specialists' performance, beginning to take account of Notes
usage, extent of process documentation, and writing skills. Use of the Notes artifact by specialists
both reinforced and changed the CSD status quo. It reinforced the CSD's team-based structure,
collective orientation to problem solving, and cooperative behavior. It changed the CSD's largely
undifferentiated team structure into one distinguishing junior and senior team members, and it
centralized the knowledge of the department in a database accessible by all, facilitating information
sharing and proactive help giving, as well as online monitoring by managers.
Another important contrast between the Alpha and Zeta uses of the Notes artifact was the relation
of use to work practices. Within Zeta, the Notes artifact was specifically deployed to mediate the
work of the CSD support specialists. This was the explicit objective behind the Notes adoption, the
basis on which the ITSS application was designed within Notes, and the orientation during training
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when specialists practiced on ITSS and Notes by working through simulated customer calls. At
Zeta, thus, use of the Notes artifact was explicitly tied to work practices, and this relationship was
expressly communicated to specialists in their mandatory and intensive training sessions. At Alpha,
use of the Notes artifact was not tied specifically to the work practices of consulting. The
motivation behind its adoption was a broad objective to improve information exchange and
leverage the knowledge of the firm. The deployment of the artifact was left open ended, no work-
specific applications were provided to users, and the training was brief, general, technical, and
voluntary. Many consultants' had difficulty relating use of the artifact to their work practices and
few of them saw much value in utilizing the artifact. It is thus not surprising that these consultants
engaged in technological shunning, skepticism, and substitution. Where consultants did see some
value, they explored use of the artifact in new ways but the continued lack of integration with work
practices and unresolved issues of conflict with institutional norms prevented such efforts from
having a sustained impact.
Applying the technology-in-use perspective to studies of technology, as I have done here, changes
the research orientation from one that seeks universal outcomes from the use of a given
technological artifact, to one that seeks generalizable patterns in the interactions users have with
technological artifacts within specific technological and organizational conditions. Six patterns of
using technological artifacts -- shunning, skepticism, substitution, exploration, facilitation, and
improvisation -- were evident in the empirical studies of two different organizations and sets of
users. More research is clearly needed, but these offer an initial and suggestive starting point. They
suggest that in institutional contexts that resemble the Alpha Corporation (hierarchic,
individualistic, competitive, time-oriented) and technological artifacts with features similar to those
offered by the Notes product (collaborative, open-ended, customizable), actors will -- in the
absence of task-specific applications and institutional support -- likely enact technologies-of-use
that shun, substitute, or merely dabble with the artifact. In institutional contexts that resemble the
Zeta Corporation's CSD department (team-based, cooperative, and problem-solving oriented) and
technological artifacts with features similar to those offered by the Notes product (collaborative,
open-ended, customizable), actors will -- in the presence of task-specific applications and support
for use -- likely enact technologies-of-use that appropriate the artifact to facilitate and improve work
practices. Such generalizations of the patterns found here to other settings and uses of artifacts is
an important empirical question for future research.
The focus on technologies-in-use as distinct from the technological artifact also allows an
examination of the extent to which users of the artifact realize the designers' intentions. It has long
been recognized that artifacts are often not used as designed or intended (Bijker, 1995; von Hippel,
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1988), but getting an adequate grasp of how, where, and why the slippage between design and use
occurs in practice has been difficult. The analytic distinction I have proposed here between
technological artifacts and technologies-in-use, offers I believe, a way to explore and explain this
process. For example, the examination of the Notes artifact and its designers' intentions as well as
the features built into the artifact, provides a profile of potential use that may be compared against
the actual technologies-in-use realized in practice. It highlights the duality inherent in organizational
technology, that technology entails both artifact and action. Of the six patterns of use discussed
above, only the technological facilitation and improvisation technologies-in-use can be said to
realize the collaborative intent of the Notes designers.
IMPLICATIONS
In this paper, I have argued that an understanding of technology requires a recognition of the
relationship between the technologies we confront as artifacts in our daily lives, and the
technologies-in-use we enact in our everyday practices. A distinction between technological artifact
and technologies-in-use allows an investigation of how different technologies-in-use are structured
by actors using a particular technological artifact over time. This framing is, I believe, a useful way
of dealing conceptually with the puzzle that the prescribed technological artifact is not the same as
the realized technology-in-use. To date, our conceptualizations of technology have tended to
obscure this distinction. As Wynne (1988:148) puts it: "a formal public image of technology as
mechanical, rule-following behavior belies a far less clearly rule-bound and determined world of
real technological practices." Similarly, Barley (1990:99) argues for the importance of recognizing
that "a technology's material constraints .... must be transformed into social forces." The notion of
technology-in-use explicitly recognizes such a conversion; it represents the ongoing enactment
through technology practices of the constraints and enablements afforded by technological artifacts.
Studying the action taken with technological artifacts within particular organizational contexts, does
not relinquish the search for general patterns or regularities in relationships. To echo Suchman's
(1987:179) point about human action in general, use of technological artifacts "is not
predetermined, but neither is it random." The technology-in-use approach to studying technology
in organizations explicitly requires the identification of patterns of situated interaction with an
artifact. These patterns articulate how actors use (or don't use) specific technological artifacts
within particular institutional contexts, and how these certain patterns of use generate rules and
resources that structure organizational practices, either changing or reinforcing them. By
conceiving of technologies-in-use as the patterned, situated interactions between artifact and action,
we can identify, investigate, and compare different types of technologies-in-use realized with the
same technological artifact. Without a notion of the kinds of action taken with technological
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artifacts in particular contexts, organizational research cannot offer an account of why and how
certain technological artifacts are associated with organizational stability and change.
To understand the complexity of technology-based organizational change, theoretical attention must
focus not only on the technological artifact that enters into organizational processes, but also the
technology that is constituted in practice. The vocabulary I have outlined here acknowledges and
takes account of the ongoing dialectic between given technological artifacts and use of them in
practice. This vocabulary allows us to capture important differences in what people do with
technological artifacts in different places and at different points in time. Without distinguishing
between technological artifact and technology-in-use, studies that measure technological
deployment across organizations to predict the impacts of technology on organizations (structure,
skills, work, performance, etc.) can only analyze technological artifacts ("prescribed technology")
not the technology that is used in practice ("technologies-in-use"). This is because the
configurations of hardware and software, methods, techniques, or knowledge that appear
artifactually and conceptually on the factory floor or people's desktops, in workplace manuals or
human cognitions, are different to the technology that is enacted in use by humans in the conduct
of everyday activities. It has been estimated that US corporations spent upwards of $1 trillion on
information technology in the last decade (BusinessWeek, 1993). What these corporations spent
their money on was technological artifacts. Such artifacts will serve to facilitate human action when
enacted as technologies-in-use. No statistics are available on the amounts and kinds of
technologies-in-use being enacted in corporations because we have tended to focus on the material
artifacts and downplayed their use in practice. The distinction between technological artifacts and
technologies-in-use allows us to understand that investment in technological artifacts is no
guarantee of corresponding organizational change around use of those artifacts. Organizational
change depends not on technological artifacts alone but also, and more critically, on technologies-
in-use.
With the conceptual vocabulary proposed here, analysts may begin to differentiate between
adoption and implementation of technological artifacts and the uses to which they are put in
organizations. It allows explanations of how and why use of technological artifacts may or may not
conform to the intentions of the artifacts' designers, and how and why such use may result in
anticipated and unanticipated changes in organizational structures, work practices, and
performance. In addition, the perspective outlined here allows for comparative analysis across
organizations by revealing similarities and differences in the technologies-in-use generated by use
of the same technological artifact. The empirical example discussed above identified six different
types of technologies-in-use that were being routinely enacted with a single technological artifact in
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different contexts of use. While these findings are interesting in their own right, they also offer the
possibility for investigating the generalizability of the technologies-in-use identified within Alpha
and Zeta. Such an investigation might look at the use of the same artifact within the same
organization over time, or at the use of different technological artifacts within the same
organization. These technologies-in-use may also be examined across organizational contexts using
the same technological artifact, as well as across organizational contexts using different artifacts. In
addition, the focus on technologies-in-use recognizes that while they become reified such
technologies-in-use can and do change and often initiate other structural changes in the process. In
what conditions and with what intentions do actors change their habituated technologies-in-use are
important empirical questions that can be addressed by the perspective proposed here.
The practice-based conceptualization of technology proposed here may be particularly useful given
the kinds of technological artifacts being developed and implemented in organizations today.
Sometimes referred to as "radically tailorable tools" (Malone. Lai, and Fry, 1992), these
technological artifacts, typically realized in computer software, are less predetermined, fixed-
function, and specific-purpose than prior artifacts. They tend to be more open-ended, serving as
infrastructures or general-purpose platforms on which users may build their own local
customizations and applications which convert the generic delivered artifact into a context-specific
work aid. It is no longer possible with these technological artifacts to anticipate the kind of uses to
which they will be put. When organizations acquired metal turning equipment, CT scanners, or
ATM machines, the range of functions that could be invoked by users was largely given and
constrained. While users could, and did, deviate from the prescribed functionality, appropriating
the given artifacts to enact a variety of technologies-in-use, they were usually unable to modify the
basic functionality of the artifacts. With the new information technologies being developed and
deployed today, this is no longer the case, and users will have -- at least technically -- the capability
of defining a wide array of functions with which to then enact various technologies-in-use. As
Sproull and Goodman (1990: 257) note: "[P]rogrammable technology allows for the possibility of
continuous redesign." Given such characteristics of artifacts, the ability to trace the kinds of
organizational changes afforded by use of these new artifacts will require distinguishing between
the artifact and the multiple situated uses actors enact with them.
Technology is a duality of action and artifact; if there is no action, there is no technology -- only
artifact. While studying technological artifacts is a necessary condition for understanding
technology in organizations, it is not sufficient to explain what humans actually do with those
artifacts in particular organizational circumstances. And it is this latter that is the technological
phenomenon of interest to organizational research.
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